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This article critiques the idea that Africa under existing conditions of globalisation can take con-
trol of its own destiny in the 21st century. It does so by interrogating the empirical economic evi-
dence for recent growth figures on the continent. It argues the optimism that Africa is on the verge 
of an economic breakthrough is misplaced and needs to be set in the historical context of recur-
rent optimism that quickly fades under the realities of exploitation and underdevelopment in the 
continent. Opportunities for sustainable growth and development lie not with greater integration 
with the world economy but with, among other things, local political and economic struggles in 
Africa for greater participation in local decision making and control of international capital.
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  Introduction
We are once again at a moment of great optimism for Africa regarding the prospects for 
development, economic growth, improved standards of living and health and welfare provi-
sion.1 This, together with a widespread  state of peace, except of course for the Rwandan and 
Ugandan interventions by proxy in DRC, has led to an outpouring of rhetoric: ‘Africa rising: the 
hopeful continent’ (The Economist 3 Dec 2011). This contrasts sharply with The Economist head-
line of a decade earlier which described Africa as ‘the hopeless continent’ (The Economist, 13 May 
2000). The UK Observer newspaper has also had a special supplement on Africa’s new start 
and burgeoning middle class demonstrated by an increase in continental Porsche sales, and 
of course the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) the World Bank, International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank have all spoken about an ‘African Awakening’, 
although it is not always clear from what the continent has woken. The Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA) has talked repeatedly about ‘Unleashing Africa’s Potential as a pole of Global 
Growth’ (2012: 59). And the view is also expressed that the continent can provide a mechanism 
for the global recovery of an ailing world economy.
1  I am grateful to anonymous reviewers and to Yao Graham, Coordinator of Third World Network (TWN) Africa 
for comments on an early version of this paper and for questions from an enthusiastic audience when the paper 
formed the basis of the Annual Distinguished Lecture on Africa organised by Ghent University on 7 December 
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The idea that the continent can be a source of global growth has also been part of a 
recent book on Francophone Africa (Severino & Ray 2012). Ex World Banker, now equity 
fund manager Jean-Michel Severino and French Foreign Affairs advisor Olivier Ray assert 
in their monograph the need not to look back in the ‘rear view mirror’ but forward with 
‘telescopes’. In doing so they argue the importance of understanding Africa’s complexity 
not through the lenses of compassion and charity but to see the continent as a ‘newcomer 
at the feast of common prosperity’…‘its headlong feverish rush to development can make 
its swarming youth one of the engines of world growth’ (2012:265). The mention of Af-
rica’s youth is important as two out of three African’s are under the age of 25, a demo-
graphic that clearly influences and helps to shape the daily struggles over expectations 
and existing development.
The tone and the content of the new debate about Africa are striking in the desire 
not to look back at the continent's history to help explain contemporary development 
implications. It is as if understanding the history of the continent simply roots analysis   
in the past. Doing so it seems might restrict commentary by allocating blame on colonial 
transformation and globalisation rather than exploring new demographics, urbanisation 
and the role of the new African middle class. As Paul Collier notes in an enthusiastic in-
troduction to Severino and Ray’s Africa’s Moment, ‘The gap is striking between the Africa 
that we see, as if fixed in the last century, and its contemporary realities’ (in Severino & 
Rey 2012:2). Paul Collier laments, ‘we need to get to know Africa again’ (2012:2). And 
in doing so instead of constantly recalling the horrors caused by the colonial interven-
tions of the slave trade, European genocide and imperialism we should focus attention 
on governance and the frailties of African leaders (World Bank 2003). This is an appeal-
ing message to Europeans who would rather forget the atrocities of say King Leopold of 
Belgium’s reign of terror in Congo (Hochschild, 1998) rather than locate an understand-
ing of contemporary underdevelopment within an important historical context. 
This article argues that it is important to understand the gravity of the consequenc-
es of the historical and uneven incorporation of Africa into the world economy. I will 
not offer historical narratives that could range from slavery to structural adjustment and 
poverty reduction strategies. Those processes highlight how first merchant capital and 
then informal colonialism and imperialism subverted development and ‘abjected’ Afri-
cans while western commentators talked of compassion and charity as light was shone 
on the ‘dark continent’ (Harrison, 2010; Cooper, 2002). Instead I indicate how the con-
temporary dynamics of transformation and the western ‘hype' that Africa can grasp op-
portunities in the 21st century obscures debate about exploitation, and inequality, that 
is a product of western entanglement as well as local class actors seeking to promote 
restrictive notions of ‘development’. These tend to be views of development manufac-
tured in the West. These views offer aims which are currently unobtainable and would 
certainly commit us to collective suicide if it were to be development fuelled by hydro 
carbons. In understanding development challenges and opportunities in Africa we need 
to look to the past and to the future. Our vision needs to be shaped by understanding the 
mechanisms of surplus extraction and the externalisation of the continent to see why afrika focus — 2013-06 [ 53 ]
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and how debates about Africa’s ‘moment’ have been recurrent and persistent and why 
they are also flawed.
This article looks at the source of the optimism that is so frequently expressed in 
relation to Africa.  We might ask to what extent we can generalise about a continent of 54 
countries but we need not be too shy about claiming that there are broad issues that can 
be used to help shape a general picture. Africa is the second biggest continent covering 
20 per cent of the earth’s landmass, and it is the second most populous with more than 
a billion people – about 15 per cent of the world’s population. The common features 
which I stress include the continent’s structural location within the world economy, ex-
port commodity dependence and similarities regarding de-industrialisation, unemploy-
ment and agricultural stagnation. Other generalisations are less helpful. For example, 
Blair’s Africa Commission 2005 report that Africa had ‘suffered from governments that 
have looted’, ...‘that cannot deliver services’ and from states that are predatory. Yet we 
know too that ‘[t]here is no compelling evidence that Africa’s leaders are on the whole 
less talented than those in any other part of the world’ (Ellis, 2012:148) therefore the pre-
occupation with leadership and thus with governance and ‘big man’ theory of politics is 
unhelpful and ahistorical (Young 2010).
In taking stock of development in Africa I review the contemporary optimism among 
many commentators and analysts against long standing structural obstacles to develop-
ment in Africa. In doing this I interrogate what development has come to represent and 
speculate as to where might lie the political spaces for alternative and active resistance to 
mainstream policy and discourse about the continent. I argue that the common optimism 
about potential for African growth and development  quickly fades when confronted by 
the systemic features of post WW2 capitalism and the patterns of globalisation that fol-
lowed the internationalisation of capital in the 1950s and 60s.
  The Optimism
‘The experience of the last decade suggests strongly that Africa is likely to make 
the twenty-first century its own’ (ECA, 2012:1). This reinforced the claim made by the 
World Bank on the eve of the 21st century that Africa could ‘claim’ the century (World 
Bank, 2000) and there were great growth opportunities for investors.  Kofi Annan, Chair 
of the Africa Progress Panel (APR) (www.africaprogresspanel.org) has noted that ‘Africa 
is on its way to becoming a preferred investment destination, a potential pole of global 
growth, and a place of immense innovation and creativity’ (Annan, 2012a:3) and he also 
notes there is a long way to go. 
A key measure of the continent’s success is the much vaunted gross domestic pro-
duction (GDP) figures. GDP on the continent grew by an average of 5.6 per cent between 
2002 and 2008. This meant the continent was the second fastest growing continent in the 
world, at least for some of the time, behind Asia. And 7 of the fastest growing economies 
in 2011 were African (ECA 2012:11-14). The ECA asserts that many of these fast growing 
economies were not dependent upon oil and gas and 70 per cent of the people living in 
these African economies were in countries that averaged economic growth rates of over afrika focus — Volume 26, Nr. 1 [ 54 ]
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4 per cent over the last ten years. Here ‘Development’ is equated with economic growth, 
but while this is a crucial measure we will need to ask how, if at all, GDP growth data 
translates into people’s well being.
The global capitalist crisis that has run since 2008 makes it unlikely that levels of 
continental growth will remain high, and in fact growth has been very uneven. There was 
a slowing of growth in West Africa relating to conflict in Cote d’Ivoire but the region was 
sustained by Ghana’s oil and gas revenue; Central Africa growth fell in 2011 to 4.2 per 
cent as oil production was affected in Chad by strikes and falls in remittances as a result 
of NATO intervention to depose Gadhafi. And in Southern Africa growth was lower in 
2010 at 3.5 per cent and here too growth was shaped by oil and mining output from Bot-
swana, Mozambique, Zambia and Angola.
The roller coaster world of growth was helped by debt relief of more than $100 bil-
lion. It has also been helped by a 64 per cent increase in aid to Africa since 2004, al-
though this has slowed significantly since 2008. Debt relief in particular is marked out 
as contributing to improved poverty indicators. Between 1999 and 2008, the proportion 
of African’s living on less than $1.25 a day fell from 58 per cent to 48 per cent – 9 million 
taken out of poverty according to the World Bank 2005-2008 (APR, 2012:16). And while 
many of the MDGs will not be met, social indicators are, according to the Africa Progress 
Report, moving in the right direction: fewer children dying before their 5th birthday and 
improvements in the numbers of children attending school.
The explanations for these improvements and the optimism for Africa’s claims on 
the 21st century lie with western generosity to erase debts, many of which were odious 
and toxic, and also of course to reschedule payments to ensure that finance continues to 
lubricate the world system (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2001). The generosity of donors has 
also been important. This is reflected in increased aid, for example, Global Alliances for 
Vaccines and Immunisations and increased access to anti-retrovirals. Yet this may have 
been driven less by western largesse than by resistance movements of those with HIV/
AIDs and African governments prepared to challenge the global dominance of pharma-
ceutical companies (Epstein, 2007). Access to anti-retrovirals grew from less than 14 per 
cent in 2005 to 43 per cent in 2008 (CAR, 2010:3).
  Interpreting Optimism
Closer inspection of the growth and development indicators used by optimistic 
commentary about African development suggest the need for a more cautious approach 
to understand the contemporary situation and the need to look at Africa’s development 
in a broader context. 
In 2010 continental growth at around 4.7 per cent was well below the proposed im-
portant sustained growth of 7 per cent seen by the Africa Commission 2005 and World 
Bank literature as necessary for poverty to be significantly (and permanently) reduced. 
African economies, moreover, remain the least diversified in the world and the 2010 up-
date from the Commission for Africa noted that 80 per cent of all African exports come 
from oil, minerals and agricultural goods (CFA, 2010:10). Only 12 per cent of growth 
comes from the agricultural sector that accounted for 60 per cent of the workforce and afrika focus — 2013-06 [ 55 ]
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a clear indication of poor labour productivity. Conceding the difficulty of generalising 
growth and of the need for diversification the ECA has tempered its upbeat assessment 
of continental political economy by noting that:
‘The last decade’s impressive growth must be examined in a proper context if Africa is to become 
a global growth pole, for the fact remains that the sources of Africa’s growth have changed very 
little over the years: agriculture and natural resources remain the main drivers, and Africa has 
diversified its economies in little meaningful way’ (ECA, 2012:1).
There is a structural imbalance to African economies that are mostly characterised 
by an overdependence upon rent rather than productive (manufacturing) growth. Capital 
intensive growth in labour surplus economies is a recurrent feature of underdevelopment 
and the failure to diversify economic growth away from hydro carbons has implications 
for vulnerabilities to the vagaries of the international market; failure of retained earnings; 
value added layers that accrue outside of the continent and the failure to break down en-
clave development. Thus inward investment into parts of Africa that is used as evidence 
for the continents grasp of the 21st century is mostly in minerals and hydrocarbons, it is 
investment that does not ‘trickle down’, but instead leaps over territory and state policy 
to limited spatial areas of extractive practices (Ferguson, 2007). Moreover, Africa, still 
has just 5.3 percent of the world’s share of foreign direct investment US$72.2 billion in 
2008 mostly restricted to the oil and gas producers, Angola, Ghana, Algeria and Egypt 
(UN, 2010;3).
We should also note that at the macro-economic level GDP of SSA was just $744 bil-
lion in 2008 and the economies of South Africa and Nigeria accounted for 56 per cent of 
the continents GDP – in comparison, Belgium, with a population of about 10.5 million 
had a GDP of about $500 billion in 2011. In contrast the GDP of Nigeria is less than the 
output of Greater London and the output of Ghana is equal to the output of a city such 
as Liverpool.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) indicators are also less than the 50 per cent 
increase in levels promised at Gleneagles in 2005. Africa receives just 35 per cent of the 
promised increase in ODA and its total external debt in 2009 was the highest since the 
early 2000’s at $300.6 billion (UN, 2012:4). This debt is almost 30 per cent of GDP – 80 
per cent of export earnings. Debt service costs as a percentage of exports are 16 per cent, 
which is far less than the 40 per cent of the pre HIPC initiative years. But it is still at levels 
that eat into development expenditure and a write off would not impact on the interna-
tional financial system although bankers assert that any further debt cancellation would 
merely reward ‘moral turpitude’.
Structurally restrictive impediments to sustained and equitable growth and devel-
opment in Africa remain, and one issue that needs to be explored is the extent to which 
African leaders can have an impact on these structures or whether they and people on the 
continent are mere carriers of the forces of globalisation? Do they just need to hang on 
and claim any benefits from a rising tide of capitalist development?afrika focus — Volume 26, Nr. 1 [ 56 ]
r.c. bush
The Africa Progress Report may be the most reflective of commentaries from the 
array of international agencies and IFIs that offer accounts of Africa’s potential for devel-
opment. Their recent report discounts extreme pessimism and notes that there are real 
recent gains but that persistent inequality is ‘ethically indefensible... economically ineffi-
cient and politically destabilising’ (2012,2). They note that there are still 386 million Afri-
cans struggling on less than $1.25 a day and that despite economic growth the continent 
accounts for a rising share of world poverty – up from 21 per cent in 1999 to 29 per cent 
in 2008 (2012,16). Africa also accounts for some of the highest global wealth disparities, 
especially in Botswana and South Africa. In these two countries the Gini index (a measure 
of inequality capturing concentration of household income or expenditure – the higher 
the index the greater the inequality) is over 60. The poorest 20 per cent in Sub Saharan 
Africa typically receive 6 per cent or less of national income and the poorest 40 per cent 
in most cases receive less than 15 per cent. One question that needs to be posed is what 
is the relation between growth and inequality? International agencies do not explore the 
idea of poverty and inequality in relational terms. They merely assert that growth will 
trickle down. Instead, what we have tended to see is increased dispossession and abjec-
tion of the poor while the more privileged become ever more wealthy.
A key driver of the revolutionary uprising in Egypt in January 2011, for example, was 
inequality: more than 50 per cent of Egyptians live on less than $2 a day – up to 80 per 
cent in the countryside. Yet Egypt had experienced sustained per capita economic growth 
of more than 3 per cent over 10 years – growth figures that most developing countries de-
sire: how do we explain the phenomenon of Egypt developing (in GDP terms) but Egyp-
tians not? (Bush, 2004; Bush & Ayeb, 2012).
Thus despite, or is it because (?) of the type of growth in the last 10 years in Africa 
almost half of all Africans live below $1.25 a day poverty line. But another 30 per cent, 
246 million, live on between $1.25 and $2.50 day – still an extreme level of poverty. Only 4 
per cent of Africans have an income of more than $10 a day to live on – this is the magical 
figure to define a middle class – the actors that we are told will drive Africa towards de-
velopment. But this investment of hope in a middle class is fraught with both definitional 
imperfections and over-reliance on the notion as the driver for sustained growth and de-
velopment. According to the Brookings Institute membership of the global middle class 
is defined in the range of earning $10-$100 a day. Using these figures Africa accounts for 
2 per cent of the world middle class population and 1 per cent of its purchasing power 
(APR, 2012:17).
Care has to be used in accepting the face value of optimistic interpretation of Africa’s 
development trajectory. Most of the MDGs will not be met, more than 30 million children 
remain outside of school and human capital development is poor; food insecurity is high 
and will worsen as global food prices and speculation in grain and climate change inten-
sifies and this at a time when Africa has lost enormous tracts in land grabs: in ten years 
almost a 1000 acquisitions have taken place totalling 134 million hectares – an area larger 
than France, Germany and the UK combined (APR, 2012:40-42; Margulis et al., 2013).afrika focus — 2013-06 [ 57 ]
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  Dependency Rules, OK?
We can now begin to ask what the review of Africa’s continental growth figures may 
mean and what it says about development in Africa in the contemporary period?
My argument is that at the heart of the debates in the donor communities and the 
IFIs is a continuous strand of modernisation, to more fully integrate parts of the conti-
nent into the world economy – namely the minerals and hydrocarbon producing econo-
mies and to ensure that Africans in other parts of the continent remain where they are.   
The strategy for the mineral producers is simple: at best promote an agenda of trans-
parency and openness for good governance and engagement with civil society, actors 
like Publish What You Pay, Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative and so on. The 
strategy for ‘development’ elsewhere on the continent, smaller land locked economies is 
the provision of development assistance that provides for bare life (Duffield 2007) and or 
securitisation as in the Sahel with AFRICOM and concerns with pastoralist mobilisation 
in Mali, Kenya and elsewhere (Keenan 2009).
Donors have been unable to move from agendas of charity and good conscience and 
where they may have done so it is to promote a securitisation agenda on the continent. 
This in part is a strategy to prevent African migrants reaching European shores as with 
fortress Europe elaborated in FRONTEX, the EU’s ‘border management’ strategy, while 
simultaneously talking about the importance of development in Africa (Cross, 2013).   
The measure for African development is continues to be the western model of modernity: 
industrial growth. Yet this is absent and under existing global dynamics and local man-
agement is impossible. Where there is growth in Africa it is capital intensive in labour 
surplus economies. The continent is set to fail the targets set for development where 
they have been constructed according to western norms. And an over reliance on Chinese 
investment seems unlikely to provide an alternative direction for growth. On the surface 
perhaps the idea that this investment may be an exchange of infrastructure expansion for 
raw materials seems at least potentially positive for African states. But its value diminish-
es when Chinese labour is employed and there may be little to boost regional connectivity 
and effective local demand.
The language of the moment for the IFIs is ‘structural transformation’. This term 
means ‘unleashing Africa’s potential as a pole of global growth’ via a strategy of political 
leadership, national (sic) development and the mobilisation of a middle class for private 
sector investment (ECA, 2012:2).  What emerges is a narrative that celebrates post – 2000 
growth that was based on improved governance and economic management, reduced 
levels of corruption and growth in new service sectors. But as we have seen there remain 
structural crises persist. And where there is an assumption that the market and a middle 
class can drive growth it is not clear how or why a middle class would drive sustainable 
and employment generating growth.
Africa has suffered immeasurable damage as a result of the ways in which neo-lib-
eral reforms recast even the possibility and certainly the acceptable language for social 
change after the early 70s. As Giovanni Arrighi (2002) noted in exploring Africa’s tragedy, 
after WW2 the continent grew, often more quickly than elsewhere and in a sustained way. afrika focus — Volume 26, Nr. 1 [ 58 ]
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Driven by high expectations and state managed economies (although not always without 
managerial difficulties) the 60s witnessed an emphasis on infrastructural growth and 
investment in productive industries. Import substitution industrialisation was seen as 
acceptable and official development assistance or AID to offset inadequate local savings 
could be used to boost economic growth and cope with foreign exchange shortages.
In the international economic crisis of the 70s, however, Africa was simply less well 
equipped to deal with global transformations. As Arrighi again noted, ‘some countries 
or regions have the power to make the world market work to their advantage, while oth-
ers do not, and have to bear the cost’. This may be seen to lie in good or bad luck that 
has ‘deep roots in a particular historical heritage that positions a country or a region 
favourably or unfavourably in relation to structural and conjunctural processes within the 
world system’. Africa’s tragedy, if that is an appropriate word, lies in its ‘pre-colonial and 
colonial heritage which has gravely handicapped the region in the intensely competitive 
global environment engendered by the US response to the crisis of the 1970s (Arrighi, 
2002:16).
The damage done to Africa and by African leaders who colluded with structural 
adjustment in the 80s has been and continues to be felt. In the two ‘lost’ development 
decades of the 80s and 90s, unemployment soared. Levels of health and welfare, infra-
structure and well being were decimated and African states were viewed as having the te-
merity to seek independent trajectories for development (Easterly 2001). More and more 
it seemed the answers to the ‘central historical question’ (Rosenberg, 2006 in Brown 
& Hanlin 2013:5) as Eric Hobsbawm called the development challenge, peddled by the 
west were failing in Africa and the Global South. As Eduardo Galeano noted development 
became the ‘promise of politicians, and justification of technocrats, the illusion of the 
outcast’ (1997:214).
Something fundamental had happened in the 80s and it continues today: it was no 
longer possible to see ‘development conceived of as a project for change undertaken col-
lectively by the population of a single, medium-sized country, acting through the state’ 
(Leys,1996:41). The 80s saw the erosion of controls of capital, expansion of financial 
markets where states had difficulty setting their own exchange rates and with this there 
was the loss of control over fiscal policy and state spending (Leys,1996:42). Per capita 
growth rates in SSA fell as deregulation emerged. If the post war period had seen a sense 
of direction and purpose in Africa, with strong political and economic leadership from, 
for example, Nasser in Egypt and Nkrumah in Ghana, the 80s onwards has seen an ongo-
ing decline in the possibility of a locally constructed and meaningful development strat-
egy. To cite Colin Leys again, ‘It is hardly too much to say that by the end of the 1980s the 
only development policy that was officially approved was not having one – leaving it to 
the market to allocate resources, not the state’ (Leys,1996:42).
Catching up with the west, if it had ever been possible, was certainly not feasible 
in the context of changed international neo-liberal circumstances, yet failure to do so 
continues to draw criticism of Africa. The critique it seems lies in offering an account 
of Africa as the child, who needs constant help or a renegade ‘failed’ state that needs afrika focus — 2013-06 [ 59 ]
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protecting from itself. This protection might be offered by new forms of ‘trusteeship’ 
or intervention (Collier, 2008) necessary to get African states back on track (whatever 
that might mean) – Sierra Leone, Liberia, but what about DRC? Here perhaps the work 
of Cowen and Shenton (1996) best accounts for why and how trusteeship of surplus peo-
ples becomes a core feature of post WW2 development discourse. While President Tru-
man’s January 1949 speech indicating the need to help the least fortunate members of 
the human race shaped aid after WW2 it was also self-serving. And that has continued 
as the fear of global inequality, especially post 9/11, is seen to aggravate southern dis-
sent with regard to the western way of life. Thus the idea that development in Africa may 
now be about ensuring minimal living standards (bare life) is maintained in a context of 
humanitarian and development rhetoric (Duffield, 2007; Arendt, 1958; Bauman, 2004; 
Evans, 2013). The West’s concern with extreme poverty and poverty alleviation ignores 
the causes and consequences of inequality and also policies that might mitigate it.
Binyavanga Wainaina (2005; 2012) has captured the persistent view of Africa as a 
child-like and mysterious ‘other’. Paternalism and religiosity is a cover for Africa’s con-
tinued subjugation and the power of the west to shape development agendas, but it does 
not do so without resistance from Africans. The recent attempts discussed above to ex-
clude serious analytical stock taking of the consequences of Africa’s historical past ex-
plains why the continent´s development weaknesses are explained in terms of poor state 
capacity – something that was in any case undermined by western SAP policy in the 80s.   
It also helps explain why the strategies offered to the continent’s leaders inevitably in-
volve further incorporation into existing globalised structures rather than any possible 
alternative routes and it helps explain the pathologising of politics in Africa as structured 
by tribalism and the politics of ethnicity (Bond, 2006; Bush, 2007).
  Capitalist exploitation and resistance
We can now return to the structural impediments for African growth and also look 
at the ways in which these obstacles are challenged by struggles in the continent. By do-
ing this we can indicate how the political spaces that may be opening up might provide 
a context for development and social transformation with justice and greater equity at its 
core.
In his introduction to the APR Kofi Annan notes that ‘Extreme disparities in income 
are slowing the pace of poverty reduction and hampering the development of broad-
based economic growth’ (APR, 2012:4). But Annan and the APR fail to unpack the dy-
namics of current uneven development on the continent. In particular there seems little 
connectivity between the desire to demonstrate how well the continent is progressing 
towards improved GDP while failing to mention the issues raised in a series of Economic 
Commission for Africa reports that have looked at illicit financial flows from Africa (see 
www.eca.org). As chair of a UN committee that has investigated illicit flows from Africa 
erstwhile South African President Thabo Mbeki noted how the majority of multinational 
corporate company earnings of $1.5 trillion in Africa each year are transferred out of the 
continent. These transfers avoid taxation, drain African economies of crucial liquidity afrika focus — Volume 26, Nr. 1 [ 60 ]
r.c. bush
and hard currency and accelerate income inequalities. Mbeki’s report examines what is 
called Africa’s greatest economic sabotage because amongst other things ‘it perpetuates 
Africa’s economic dependence upon other regions’ (ECA, 2012a:np).
MNCs control about 60 per cent of world trade, about $40 trillion dollars and 
Mbeki’s committee notes that perhaps as much as $22 billion is transferred out of Africa 
illicitly each year – a significant proportion of the continent’s debt and development as-
sistance. In this context corporate social responsibility seems a long way from delivering 
the potential for development as the major banks are implicated in these transfers as are 
the big mining and oil and gas companies. 
There thus seems to be collusion between some local African elites, special foreign 
interests and ‘wilful blindness on the part of Western financial institutions and govern-
ments’ (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2012:2). In 2010 a number of African leaders were implicat-
ed in illicit wealth creation, for example the presidents of Republic of Congo, Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011; 2012). All of these leaders were accused of 
embezzling public money from oil economies where the per capita incomes were some 
of the highest on the continent but where levels of poverty and inequality were some of 
the highest in Africa.
Capital flight is a major block to sustainable development in Africa. Capital flight 
takes the form of direct embezzlement by politicians or under-invoicing of oil exports.   
The IMF estimates that $4 billion of Angola’s oil wealth in 2002 was unaccounted for – 
$71 billion went ‘missing’ 1985-2008 and there are similarly staggering figures for Ivory 
Coast, Cameroon and Sudan (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2012:4).
It is not only capital flight that has enabled African elites closely tied to some states 
and mineral economies to benefit from globalisation. The development experience of 
the 80s and the new modes of accumulation that it spawned helped promote a new grow-
ing class of very rich African entrepreneurs. These have emerged from strong links with 
global capitalism in real estate promoting high-end consumerism, and new consumer 
markets that are very visible in Accra and Luanda, Nairobi and Johannesburg.
The new African class of entrepreneurs in which so much is invested by the Afro 
optimists has provided a cover for the failures of de-industrialisation and the redefinition 
of structural transformation used by the IMF. Africa’s share of manufacturing in GDP fell 
from 15 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2008 – West Africa’s fell from 13 per cent to 5 per 
cent in the same period. UNCTAD has sounded the alarm on this crisis of manufacturing 
in a recent report on economic development in Africa, ‘The declining share of manufac-
turing in Africa’s output is of concern because historically manufacturing has been the 
main engine of high, rapid and sustained economic growth’ (UNCTAD, 2012:2-3). The 
absence of growth in manufacturing undermines job creation, slows the improvement of 
service provision and disappoints  youth expectations for their futures. The IFI response 
seems to be that Africa continues as a raw material exporter (for western and Chinese 
needs) while offering some mediation of ‘dependency’ with profitable transnational cor-
porate telecom development, financialisation of high-end activities such as banking and 
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African markets that has helped create Africa’s recent phase of impoverishment (Bond, 
2006; UNCTAD, 2012). 
There are several illustrations I might use to offer a sustained critique of the status 
quo and everyday resistance to Africa’s persistent underdevelopment. Space will only al-
low me to mention one set of dynamics where the issue of the plunder of Africa’s resourc-
es is met by a combined challenge from communities affected by mining and by a pan 
African initiative to both constrain mining companies and to promote local industrial 
development.
Mining companies might be seen as outriders for imperialism (Bush, 2010). Extrac-
tives are a small proportion of global FDI yet it has a disproportionate economic and 
political influence on African development. Mining companies are at the forefront of ac-
cumulation by dispossession in Africa. Accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005) 
captures a key element of contemporary capitalist exploitation. This is the persistent vio-
lence of separating producers from their means of production as farmers and peasants 
are expelled from the land. Mining companies are central to this. They expel farmers 
from mining enclaves establishing hierarchical relationships of power. Enclaves are the 
result of FDI that does not permeate beyond the spatial location of extractive locations.     
They are the source of capital intensive production in the context of labour surplus. The 
mining enclave is organised for large scale production and there is frequent intimidation 
of local inhabitants by mine operators and by mine security that stops local residents 
from entering mine areas.
Two types of violence prevail in mining enclaves: political violence in which MNCs 
can bypass government decision making and consultation and a more familiar coercive 
violence where mines are cordoned off and policed – locals who enter can expect to be 
attacked. The enclave is in many ways a metaphor for broader, persistent and systemic 
exploitation in Africa. It was most violently witnessed in South Africa in August 2012 at 
Marikana’s platinum mine run by LONMIN where 47 miners were gunned down by po-
lice in response to a strike over pay and conditions (Marinovich et al., 29 January 2013).   
The check list or main characteristics of an enclave relate to the violence and human 
rights abuses but also the ways in which expatriate labour accompanies the mining in-
vestment – as if to stand guard over it. The essential observation is that the enclave is a 
mechanism to promote the externalisation of the African economy. It provides a way in 
which local decision making is frustrated and local planning mechanisms are reduced 
and made susceptible to global market fluctuations. The enclave does not add to the ex-
pansion of the local and domestic market savings ratio and growth of a local bourgeoisie: 
it acts as a block to each of these (Mhone, 2001).
While there has been collusion between African states and mines operating in the en-
claves, ostensibly to show not only compliance with the rhetoric that FDI will drive growth 
but also because of the ‘kick backs’ that accrue and rentier politics that has emerged (Glo-
bal Witness, 2012), there has also been opposition and resistance to mines, mining and 
existing extractive relations. This has come from two main areas. The first has been from 
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‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ (Bayat, 2009). Writing about urban unrest in the 
Middle East, long before the 2011 Arab uprisings Bayat explored,
‘non collective direct actions of individuals and families to acquire basic necessities (land, shel-
ter, urban collective consumption, informal jobs, business opportunities) in a quiet, unassuming 
fashion’ (Bayat, 2000:iv).
These actions are not just a defensive coping strategy to deal with land loss and 
challenges to livelihoods. Community and other localised struggles can also advance the 
livelihoods of ordinary people and these sometimes fleeting struggles may be without 
obvious leaderships and formal organisations. In Bolivia for example, it has been report-
ed how struggles against water charging and nationalisation of gas emerged from social 
movements that drew on the ‘strength from their embeddedness in daily life’ (Spronk & 
Jeffery, 2007). In many parts of Africa, struggles waged by artisanal small scale miners 
(ASM) over land access and control of equipment and inputs for mining might contribute 
to everyday resistance to owners of land and capital.
There may be 10 million such miners in Africa, and 500,000 in Ghana where they are 
known as galamsey. Most of the discussion about the galamsey centres on their legal sta-
tus and the extent to which they degrade the environment (Hentschel et al., 2003). ASM 
may be seen to be a strategy not just of survival and livelihoods, and there are complicated 
relations between miners and funders, land owners and communities. ASM may also be 
seen as a strategy that confronts commodification of land resulting from mine conces-
sions and enclave development. ASM can be seen as a social (and political) response to 
the internationalisation of capital and its deleterious consequences that have abjected 
communities affected by mining.
Running alongside the ASM debate is the African Union’s Mining Vision initiative 
(African Union, 2009; 2011). This mining policy and strategy document is an example of 
a locally generated African initiative. It promotes the emergence of the transformation 
of mining discourse to implement a pan African policy to challenge decades of under-
development by mining companies. It is a policy that has been confronted by policy in 
Europe especially after the EU´s raw materials policy in 2008 (Commission of European 
Communities, 2008). At the heart of the AU policy is the desire to maximise revenue 
from extractives for local African development. The Vision aims to promote the ‘equita-
ble and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable 
growth and socio-economic development’ (African Union, 2009:4). In doing so the AU 
has put back on the AU policy agenda the need to revisit the historical underperformance 
of government access to revenue from local resources. The AU has also declared the need 
to re-examine the debate about the relationship between regulation and control of mines 
that was very much part of the nationalist 70s agenda. 
Crucial for the AU is an understanding of Africa’s past, of underdevelopment and ref-
erence to the much maligned 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (OAU, 1979). The AU vision may be 
an attempt to think outside the ‘mining box’ – to counter the consequences of capital inten-
sive extractives and to avoid the recurrent development failures of the extractives enclave. afrika focus — 2013-06 [ 63 ]
Making the twenty first century its own
It is an attempt to resurrect, albeit in a different global environment from the 70s, an 
agenda that will accrue greater benefits for host countries and mining communities. The 
structural limitations of pan African policy may prevail and prevent its implementation. 
As such the policy may become just another shopping list where continued dependence 
upon the West for aid and FDI undermine the ability to establish an alternative extractives 
policy. However, the AU initiative has shifted the ground fundamentally. At its core is a 
clear recognition of the failures of existing resource extraction and the need to promote a 
regional growth strategy based on improved local beneficiation.
The Africa Vision is compelling and assembles elements for a most important policy 
transformation that has the potential to reverse centuries of resource exploitation. It will 
depend not only upon state led initiatives but also grass roots support and engagement – 
a politicisation of local struggles that challenge and may threaten the legitimacy of many 
African states. In the first phases however, to raise local revenue retention it will be nec-
essary to promote and improve local tax regimes, the improved capture of local resource 
rents and royalties and an agenda that understands and values environmental transfor-
mation. This African mining vision will only be possible with popular mobilisation. 
  Conclusion
The debate about Afro optimism and pessimism continues, and while these popu-
larised discussions are important they should not blur the need to grasp the structural 
processes that underpin the headline-grabbing economic growth figures.
There is a global context in which the new optimism is unfolding. This is the prob-
able shift in power from the US and EU to Asia. A ‘scramble for Africa’ has continued, 
however, although it is important not to reduce Africa to a mere passive receiver of Chi-
na’s increased interest (Mohan & Lampert, 2012). I have argued that headline figures 
circulated by the IFIs and apologists for global capitalism obscure failures around struc-
tural transformation of African economies. These failures are continued (accelerated?) 
de-industrialisation; agricultural stagnation, financialisation; unemployment and ur-
banisation that has been de-linked from industrialisation (on the latter see Davis, 2007) 
and growth with heightened inequalities. 
The issue for the 21st century is the extent to which social movements might emerge 
to defy these continued injustices. But this begs the question of where such social forces 
might be found given the fundamental problems I have indicated above. These problems 
stem from historical and contemporary underdevelopment, and have led to the fragmen-
tation of unified social classes, the mushrooming of informal sectors and patronage 
politics with ‘choiceless’ electoral politics.
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